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Rituals of Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman:  





Ceremonial and elaborate protocols are commonly associated with kingship, authority and 
power and imbued with a sense of an ancient past. Yet traditions, particularly as pertaining to 
European practices, are often made up, choreographed and then formally instituted in a 
matter of a few years. Throughout Europe and the developing world, traditions have been, 
and continue to be, invented and kingship, oligarchy, and other institutions are set up, 
supported and occasionally simply maintained by such ceremony. Once established these 
rituals tend to take on a life of their own, sometimes thriving in an inverse relationship to the 
actual realities of power and authority.   
 
In the Middle East few studies exist which examine the study of royal rituals – invented and   
derived.  Morocco, perhaps more than any other state, has been the focus of a number of such 
studies a few others considered aspects of ceremonial and monarchy in Jordan.  In the case of 
Oman, however, there are no studies at present which consider the relationship between 
created ceremonial in the consolidation of power and authority in the perception of the 
citizens of that state. This article will briefly explore the creation and elaboration of 
ceremonial and court ritual in the Sultanate of Oman after the accession of Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said in 1970. It will attempt to show that while the creation of rituals of royalty were 
important for building a sense of national belonging among even the most remote 
communities in the country, these same ceremonials and created traditions developed lives of 
their own, stultifying courtly behaviour, and contributing little to the organic sense of  Omani 
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Rituals of Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman:  
View From the Edge 
 
 
In the early months of 1980, shortly after my arrival in the Sultanate of Oman, I was offered 
an opportunity to join a small convoy of vehicles crossing the deserts of Oman. The trip was 
to take a week and would start in Salalah, the capital of Dhofar, the southern region of Oman, 
and end up in Muscat. It was not quite the retracing of the steps of the English explorers 
Bertram Thomas in the 1930s and Wilfred Thesiger in the 1940s, but it felt like it.  We 
travelled in four-wheel drive vehicles instead of on camel, as Thomas and Thesiger had done, 
and  we  had access to some graded roads as well as the recently-opened  1,000 kilometre 
tarmacked dual-carriageway  connecting  Muscat with Salalah; but the landscape was the 
same, vast tracts of seemingly untouched open scrub, gravel, rock and sand.  The purpose of 
the journey was largely to permit a medical team to trace several lapsed tuberculosis patients 
from tribes in the interior and to provide immunization vaccines to the children of these 
communities. Several days into our journey, and half way across our proposed itinerary, we 
came across a small group of nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe families preparing to attend a 
wedding.  We stopped and took the opportunity to seek their permission to begin a course of 
immunization for their children “Why”, we were asked, “did we want to do this”?  Our reply 
was, “The Sultan of Oman wishes to see all Omanis immunized against these diseases”. 
“Why”, they continued, “should he want to do this for us”?  We were initially lost for an 
answer, having assumed that the sense of belonging to one nation, and the obligations of 
leadership had reached these parts of the country. They had not.
1.  
 
Ceremony and elaborate protocols are commonly associated with kingship, authority and 
power. The pageantry, for example, which is associated with the British monarchy in its 
public ceremonials, is imbued with a sense of an ancient past. Yet, these traditions are recent 
inventions derived from the late Victorian period
2. Traditions, particularly as pertaining to 
European practices are often made up, choreographed and then formally instituted in a matter 
of a few years, rapidly gaining a sense of permanence
3. Sometimes entirely new symbols and 
devices are made up to confirm gravitas, substance and rallying points for the new entity (e.g. 
Marianne, John Bull or Uncle Sam).  Traditions have been, and continue to be, invented and 
kingship, oligarchy, and other institutions set up, supported and occasionally simply 
maintained by such ceremony. Once established, these ceremonial rituals tend to take on a life 
of their own, sometimes thriving in an inverse relationship to the actual realities of power and 
authority.  Created or invented rituals and traditions serve several purposes:  they may 
establish or symbolize legitimate relations of authority; or particular institutions; or they may 
be used to inculcating a certain set of beliefs systems and conventions of behaviour
4. While 
the first two purposes were commonly used in British and French colonial contexts in Africa
5 
and South Asia
6, the third purpose generally characterized the inventions of rituals in the 
Middle East and North Africa. In this region, the general socialization of highly fragmented 
sets of societies and cultures was enhanced by the marking out of rituals, ceremony and new 
traditions. The creation of such practices, which included processions, bands, regalia and 
anniversaries worked to give the state and its often oligarchic leadership greater legitimacy 
while at the same time creating a sense of commonality among the diverse peoples in the 
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country. 
  In the Middle East few studies exist which examine the rituals of royalty – invented 
and derived.  Morocco has been the focus of a number of studies examining the longevity of 
Moroccan kingship
7. For centuries, Moroccan monarchs have conducted royal progressions 
(harkas) with elaborate entourages throughout the country embodying in their person and their 
companions royal authority and power
8. In Jordan, a few studies have emerged considering 
aspects of ceremonial, monarchy and national identity
9.  In the Gulf States the relationship of 
the rulers to local merchants and the later effort to create a ‘national identity’ have also been 
explored
10. In the case of Oman, however, there are no studies at present which consider the 
relationship between ceremony in the consolidation of power and authority and the perception 
of the nationals of that state
11.  This article explores the creation and elaboration of certain 
ceremonials and court rituals in the Sultanate of Oman after the accession of Sultan Qaboos in 
1970. It seeks to determine the relationship between the development of these ceremonial and 
ritual events and the perception of leadership and authority in the person of the Sultan as well 
as the development of a sentiment of common nationality. Its ethnographic underpinning is 
the most remote and marginal of Oman’s people, the nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe of the 
central desert of Oman
12. It attempts to show that, while the creation of rituals of royalty were 
important for building a sense of national belonging among this most cut-off and distant of 
communities in the country, these same ceremonies and created traditions developed lives of 
their own.  Over time these rituals ossified Sultanic courtly behaviour, contributing little to the 
organic sense of Omani citizenship, and eventually disillusioning some of these marginal 
groups.   
 
 




 The Al Bu Said Dynasty came to power in 1744
13.  Over the centuries this dynasty underwent 
swings in authority and power
14.  The mid 19
th century saw a rapid decline in Al Bu Said 
fortunes and British interests in Oman came to be directed and managed from Delhi rather 
than from Whitehall.  For the whole of the 20
th century and into the 21
st century, Oman has 
had only four rulers: Faysal (1888- 1913), Taymur (1913-1932), Said (1932 -1970) and 
Qaboos (1970 to the present).  All four rulers owed their position to British support in one 
way or another. 
  The indigenous population of the country was relatively large and markedly 
heterogeneous. In the north it included a small, elite urban merchant class with strong cultural 
ties and trade links with India and the coast of East Africa. Along the coast, subsistence 
fishing settlements were common, and in the mountains and intervening valleys, terraced 
farming communities maintained ancient systems of water collection and distribution
15. The 
few towns in the interior were centres of regional trade as well as of religious learning. The 
population of the south of the country, in Dhofar, was distinctly of South Arabian or 
Himyaritic descent sharing a distinct culture, history and language base. In the middle of the 
country’s central desert, hundreds of kilometres from agrarian and urban settlements, were a 
number of nomadic pastoral tribes some with cultural and social links derived from central 
Arabia and others from Himyaritic Yemen. This thinly-populated desert region played only a 
marginal role in Omani dynastic history. Until recently these pastoral tribes of the interior of 
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Oman had little knowledge of the secular government of the Sultan on the coast; some were 
only marginally more physically connected with the Ibadi Imam in the Jebel Akhdar of Oman.  
  By the 1920s, the Omani coastal strip under the control of the Sultan was increasingly 
in debt to the Indian merchants of Muscat.  Loans were secured from the British government 
to free the Sultan from dependence on these Indian merchants.   But these loans carried with 
them a growing dependence on Great Britain and its political and civil service.  In 1925, for 
example, Bertram Thomas was seconded to Oman as the British Financial Advisor for 
Muscat.  In actual fact, he assumed the position of Prime Minister and virtually ran the 
government during Sultan Taymur’s frequent absences abroad.   
  By the time Said was formally recognized as the ruler of Oman in 1932, the 21 year-
old had inherited a country riddled with financial difficulty. Only through frugal, nearly 
parsimonious, budgeting over the next 38 years was the Sultan able to repay the British their 
loans and thus wrestle some control of the state back into his own hands.  Eradicating the 
Sultanate’s long-term public debt through unenviable economizing was to set a pattern for 
economic management.   In the late 1930s and 1940s Sultan Said was able to implement a 
modest modernization programme and he cooperated completely with the British during 
World War II.   
  Oil exploration commenced in Oman during the 1930s. In the central desert of Oman, 
both the Harasiis and the Jeneba nomadic pastoral tribes were affected by these activities. 
Interviews with these tribesmen indicated that these incursions into their traditional territory 
were the first occasions many had had with Europeans. The Jeneba tribe living between the 
Indian Ocean and the edge of the Jiddat il-Harasiis closely watched the oil exploration 
activities and then formally laid claim to the Jiddat maintaining that it was their land which 
they merely permitted the Harasiis to occupy. Sultan Said and his advisor, Bertram Thomas, 
decided, however, that occupancy was the determining factor in land right issues and 
dismissed the Jeneba claim.  Wilkinson, moreover, suggests that the Sultan’s true motive in 
coming down on the side of the Harasiis was his confidence that the Harasiis were potentially 
stronger allies in his claim to future oil rights in the central desert interior
16.  Pastoral tribes in 
the north of the country, such as the Duru, bordering on areas under the control of the Ibadi 
Imam were increasingly being drawn into the political and armed conflict between the Sultan 
on the coast and the Ibadi Imam in the interior.  
   In 1955 an exploratory search party landed at Duqm on Oman’s eastern coast and 
made its way across the Jiddat il-Harasiis to arrive at Fahud in Duru tribal territory.  Sultan 
Said, determined to consolidate his area of interests and sovereignty over this region, 
contended in his negotiations with the oil concerns, that the Harasiis tribe in the interior and 
the Jeneba tribe along the coast near Duqm had no relationship with the Ibadi Imam in the 
north and were, by default, part of his domain.  For the Jeneba, this was a problematic 
assertion as their leader maintained a residence in an area within the Ibadi Imamate
17.   For the 
Harasiis, however, there was no strong link either to the Imam or to the Sultan; neither had a 
representative or local governor (wali) in the Harasiis tribal territory.  The Harasiis were, at 
that time, marginal to the extent and administration of the Sultan’s government   
    During this period, Sultan Said’s relationship with Great Britain was cemented by two 
near simultaneous crises.   In 1952, Saudi Arabia attempted to occupy part of Oman in the al-
Buraymi Oasis
18.  In the same year, the Imam (who allied himself with Saudi Arabia) 
launched his rebellion which spilled over into a contestation over ownership of any oil finds 
by oil company exploration teams.  In 1959 a combined assault by the Sultan’s forces and 
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those of the British on the Jebel Akhdar ended with the defeat and retreat of the Ibadi Imam 
and his rebels.  The success of the 1959 campaign heralded a period of uncontested and 
genuinely close cooperation between the Sultan and British authorities.  
   This period also saw Sultan Said search for ways to develop the country without 
‘modernizing’ it.  He prohibited the general importation of cars.  He banned sunglasses and 
torches and insisted that the gates of the capital of Muscat be closed at sunset.  He permitted 
only three schools to operate over the entire country admitting 100 boys a year, who he 
personally chose.  For most of the 1960s, Said withdrew to his palace complex in Salalah, 
Dhofar.  The Harasiis and Jeneba leaders, as well as other prominent tribal members from the 
interior deserts made annual trips to Salalah to receive monetary gifts from the Sultan in 
recognition of their political importance to him.  However, his increasingly petty and eccentric 
behaviour and occasionally outlandish rules for his subjects resulted in growing discontent 
and sporadic outbreaks of violence against him and his rule
19.   
   Yet Sultan Said, himself, was a cultured and cosmopolitan man.  Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s he made annual trips to the United Kingdom, generally in the summer
20. He 
was a keen music lover and enjoyed opera.  His summer sojourns were often passed in 
London where he frequently met and negotiated  expenditure for military hardware and troops 
with British politicians and Foreign Office officials.  During this time, British concerns over 
the Sultan’s isolation in his palace in Salalah culminated in the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, pointedly informing him that the Queen did not spend all her time in 
Balmoral Castle
21.   
   In 1964, oil was discovered in the central desert of Oman and, by 1967, it began to be 
exported.  Projected revenues jumped dramatically, but even then Said remained cautious 
about spending money he did not yet have. Thus, although he commissioned plans for a new 
port at Muscat and a hospital in Ibri among other projects, he took his time giving the go-
ahead to implement these works. Until his overthrow by his son, Qaboos, Said continued to 
act and behave with the shrewdness and calculation of someone always on the edge of 
financial ruin.  His household and his retainers were kept under very tight fiscal control, no 
excess or flourish in décor or entertainment was tolerated.  His hold over authority and power 
revolved around his relations with his armed forces and his British political agents and not 
upon any pomp or ceremony to celebrate or consolidate his reign or impress his fellow 
Omanis.  
  The unrest and growing unpopularity of the Sultan was compounded by a rebellion in 
the mountains above Salalah supported by the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen.  By the summer of 1970, fearful that the Marxist-Leninist rebellion might become 
successful, British forces quietly instigated and supported a coup d’etat led by his son, 
Qaboos. Unlike his father, and grandfather before him, Qaboos was not educated in India or 
Baghdad. The only son of a Qara, Dhofari tribeswoman, he had remained in Salalah until the 
age of 16, never once having visited the north of the country.  At this point in Qaboos’ life, his 
father agreed to dispatch him to the United Kingdom to complete his education.  He was sent 
first to the home of Philip Romans in Bury St Edmunds, East Anglia. Philip Romans was the 
retired Head Master of Baroda College of the University of Bombay who had established a 
school for students from the Arabian Gulf called Feltsham House.  Upon leaving Feltsham 
House he was enrolled in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He graduated in 1962 and 
became an officer of the British Army’s Scottish Rifles (the Cameronians), serving in 
Germany for one year. The next year, the Foreign Office secured for him several months at the 
Bury St Edmunds Council to observe public administration and accounting.  During this 
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intense residency in the UK, Qaboos, not surprisingly, began a lifelong love affair with 
military pageantry. 
  The years in the UK and, in particular, in the British Military deeply affected the 
young man.   In 1964, after a world tour chaperoned  by  retired British General, F.C.L. 
Chauncy and his wife, Qaboos returned to  Dhofar and was placed under  a virtual  ‘house 
arrest’ in the Royal Palace of Salalah by his father.   There he was instructed to study Islamic 
Law but denied any opportunity to take up an active administrative role in the government.   
Some scholars believe that, as the rebellion in Dhofar grew in intensity the British began to 
work surreptitiously towards a ‘quiet’ Palace Coup.  Others saw instead, that Qaboos, chaffing 
at his house arrest, began to make cautious inquiries through carefully screened personal 
visitors as to whether the British would support the overthrow of his father
22. On the night of 
July 23
rd, July 1970 Qaboos launched a nearly bloodless palace coup; a small group of 
supporters stormed through the palace doors and up into Said’s apartments. There they were 
met by a fusillade fired by Said and his personal slaves. Sultan Said was wounded in the foot.  
Peterson maintains that this was a self-sustained injury which occurred when Said cocked one 
of two pistols he used to defend himself
23. Said was flown out of Salalah by the British RAF 
to Bahrain, where his wounds were dressed, and then taken on to the United Kingdom where 
he lived out the last years of his life in a suite at the Dorchester Hotel on London’s Park Lane.    
   After the palace coup of 1970, Sultan Qaboos encouraged all Omanis living abroad to 
return to the country to help build a government infrastructure nearly from scratch
24.   The 
advisors to the new Sultan set about distancing the royal son from his father by over-stating, 
exaggerating and occasionally distorting known facts about the father’s ‘miserliness’ and 
eccentricities
25. In the early years of Qaboos’ reign, this information was used to distinguish 
the old order of Sultan Said from the ‘New Dawn’ of Qaboos.  It remained, for many years, 
generally understood that the father’s eccentricities had been damaging to the Oman people 
and thus justified the palace coup which brought the modern, British educated son to power. 
  In a very short period of time, the armed forces, the police force, the internal security 
service,  the civil service, and government ministries of health, education, social affairs and 
labour, agriculture and fisheries,  water and electricity, communications and roads among 
others were  rapidly set up. The trappings of a modern state were put into place almost 
overnight.  Thousands of miles of roads were tarmacked, and Muscat was connected for the 
first time by a modern road network to Salalah. The social and economic transformations of 
the coastal areas and the mountains behind in both the north and the south of the country, 
funded mainly by petroleum wealth, were enormous. The same was not true of the interior 
desert areas of the country which remained isolated from the rapid political, social and 
economical transformation taking place along the coastal region of Oman and Dhofar.  
 
Recognizing the Need to Create Traditions 
 
When Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, there was a decided lack of public ceremonial or 
palace ritual associated with monarchy in the 20
th century. This fact was played up and used to 
lay the groundwork for the elaboration of new rituals and traditions associated with the Sultan 
Qaboos’ court as well as the development of a cult of personality far removed from the 
established eccentricities of his father.  There was only one residence in Muscat for the Sultan 
(which had lain unoccupied for the previous 12 years) and another compound in Salalah. 
Rituals of hospitality were simple and reflected general Omani culture found throughout the 
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country.  Protocol for the occasional state visitor to Muscat remained peculiarly lacking in 
substance and lustre as states in other parts of the world came to increasingly sport a 
competitive inventiveness to ceremonially enhance the position of the head of state.   
  Until the late 1960s, most state visitors to Oman arrived by boat and were greeted on 
shore by a small representation of family members and others from Muscat’s small merchant 
elite appointed by the Sultan for the occasion. An internal British government memorandum 
from the British Consul General Phillips in Muscat dated August 27
th, 1960 revealed British 
Government concern for what seemed to be a questionable ‘national salute’ or anthem. The 
letter contends that the national salute was written by “the bandmaster of a cruiser in about 
1932", and that the only band in Oman which might have been able to play it was “now 
disbanded in or around 1937 (Muscat Infantry Band)”.  There were no occasions, according to 
General Phillips, at which the ‘Salutations’ was now officially played. 
  Even after the Palace purse was no longer so meagre
26, Sultan Qaboos’ father was 
loathe to develop too much elaboration around the court ceremonials or occasions of state 
arrivals and departures. He did, however, decide to purchase a twelve-man whaler for use in 
Muscat harbour to ‘meet and greet’ important guests.  Working with the offices of Charles 
Kendall and Partners in London, he commissioned a new conveyance for ceremonial 
occasions which conceptually had significance not unlike a new state carriage for the British 
monarch
27.  As the order neared completion, Sultan Said was asked by John Kendall – the son 
of the founder of the firm - what kind of dress/uniform he wished for his oarsmen in Muscat to 
wear. Sultan Said replied none, just the white long dress (dishdasha) commonly worn by all 
men in Oman. John Kendall, taking on much the same role as that of Reginald Brett, the 
‘eminence grise’ in British governing circles at the beginning of the 20
th century’,  pushed for 
some greater identifying marker  for these  men  to show that they belonged to the Royal 
Palace
28.  Kendall continued the conversation making the suggestion of a ceremonial uniform 
of white dishdasha but with straightforward waist-coats and braid. Still the Sultan declined to 
order any special uniform or ‘dress’ for these oarsmen,  explaining, that such elaboration 
would be pompous in his mind and not suitable to his Sultanic court
29.  
  Sultan Qaboos came to the throne with vastly different experience and perspectives.  
Unlike his Anglo-Indian educated father and grandfather, Sultan Qaboos had no experience of 
the world outside of Dhofar until he was sent to the United Kingdom. Adding to this 
background would have been his years at Sandhurst and a further year with the Scottish 
Rifles.  Thus, in a very short time, a young man from the south Arabian coast town of Salalah 
with practically no international experience would develop a love of many things Western, 
and particularly British: classical music, military pageantry, horsemanship, and bagpipes.  
After the coup which brought him to power, Sultan Qaboos had to set about uniting the 
disparate elements of his country - the interior with the coast and the north with the south. 
This unity, which he recognized would centre upon the person of the Sultan, needed new 
traditions to support it.  
   Sultan Qaboos was befriended by the Shah of Iran and King Hussein of Jordan – both 
of whom sent significant troop numbers to Dhofar to help Qaboos put down the rebellion in 
the mountains by the mid -1970s.  King Hussein, also a Sandhurst graduate about six years his 
senior, developed a particularly close relationship with Qaboos.  The King frequently visited 
the Sultan and it was said by many close to the Royal Court that he also tutored the Sultan in 
‘monarchic’ protocol.  One story which circulated for years was that King Hussein advised the 
young Sultan that it was befitting his status to keep his guests and petitioners waiting; the only 
exception to this rule was never to be late for the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II.  




Setting up the Structures to Elaborate Ceremony and Ritual  
 
Within a month of the coup d’etat, Sultan Qaboos appointed his uncle Prime Minister and he 
immediately set about creating the core structures of a ‘modern’ state. All British government 
employees - with the exception of those in the Defence Department - were replaced and 
Omanis were appointed as the new ministers and other high-level government post holders
30. 
The Sultan embarked on a programme designed to reinforce and celebrate his reign. The old 
Beit al-‘Alam Palace in Muscat was demolished and replaced by the new and spectacular 
Palace, Qasr al-‘Alam. Used for ceremonial occasions and state visits rather than as a regular 
residence, it was a symbol of the privileged ‘renaissance’ of the Al Said dynasty. In addition, a 
building programme of palaces and royal guest houses commenced so that by the early 1980s, 
Sultan Qaboos had at least three residences both in the north and the south of the country 
befitting his role of political leader of the nation. By the beginning of the 21
st century Sultan 
Qaboos had at least seven royal residences in the north and three in the south as well as 
residences and estates in the United Kingdom and in Germany.
31  
   By naming roads, ports, schools, hospitals, mosques, sports stadiums and residential 
areas after him, Sultan Qaboos was inscribing his presence upon the national geography
32.  
His concern for ‘his people’ was affirmed by the constant repetition of his name on radio and 
television, by the hanging of his photographs – each in a similar poised attitude of hands 
crossed across his lap - in a variety of national dress or military uniform on the walls of 
offices, businesses and private. The written press and television coverage of all the Sultan’s 
meetings, his comings and goings, the telegrams of greetings and congratulations from other 
heads of state was a daily diet consumed by all Omanis.  The linking of his name with all that 
was new, modern and progressive was in many ways like the official discourses found in 
support of state leaders in other countries of the region.  One examples of such linkage of the 
state with the person of the ruler is in the Syrian Arab Republic. Here, the regular depiction of 
Hafez al-Asad in the decades before his death in 2000, as the omnipresent and omniscient 
leader was an attempt to control the symbolic world of Syrian society.  Official rhetoric and 
images operated as a form of power helping to enforce and sustain the reign of Hafez al-
Asad
33. Thus in Oman, we can see that symbols, rhetoric, pageantry and ceremony worked to 
not only represent the person of the Sultan, but also to produce and consolidate his political 
power.  
 
Creating the Glue that Binds 
 
Sometimes symbols, created traditions and pageantry have been used to create a separation 
between one ruler and the state or to totally break from the government of the past as, for 
example, in Iran and in the Former Soviet Union.   In Oman, however, the continuity of the 
ruling dynasty was unquestioned even if the personality and approach to rule was regarded as 
diametrically opposed.  Sultan Said was replaced by his son, Qaboos. There was no immediate 
break with the past or profound change of direction which the elaboration of new ceremonials, 
traditions and pageantry confirmed.   Rather it was the recognition that the parsimonious and 
miserly qualities of the previous leadership had resulted in an almost total lack of ceremony of 
statesmanship which needed to be corrected and elaborated in the effort to unite a country 
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which had seen two serious insurrections in the previous two decades.  The country of Muscat 
and Oman needed to be glued together and this required the entry of the new Sultan and his 
iconography into the religiously infused mountains of the north of the country as well as the 
secessionist-leaning south.  
  The  consolidation of the Sultan Qaboos’ secular leadership  with the spiritual or 
religious aspects of the society was problematic, as the decades-old division between the 
Sultan and the Ibadi Imam in the Interior had created a disjuncture in the way in which the 
religious and the political were regarded by most Omanis
34. Gradually, through a concerted 
programme of building mosques – many named after him - and establishing his presence in 
these places of worship each Friday, Sultan Qaboos made his leadership felt. The splendid 
main mosque in Ruwi and the mosque of Nizwa were the first two mosques to be built by the 
Sultan
35.  This programme of building religious establishments continued throughout the 
following decades and culminated with the inauguration of the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque 
in Bausher on May 4, 2001. This immense structure covers an area of 416,000 square metres. 
With its minarets and domes, it echoes the heights of the Ottoman Empire.  Its five minarets – 
each representing one of the pillars of Islam – thus surpass even the three minarets of the 
Grand Umayyad mosque of Damascus.  
 
Creating Ceremonials and Elaborating State Occasions 
 
In the year following his accession (1971), a new celebration - perhaps inspired by British 
royal birthday tradition - became an important symbol of national unity.  The Sultan’s 
birthday took on significance beyond the personal.  It came to be a marker for national 
celebration. The actual date of the coup which brought him to power was July 23
rd36. This 
unfortunately fell during one of the hottest months of the year. Sultan Qaboos decided instead 
to celebrate this important marker of his power in November, a relatively cooler time of the 
year which was also his birthday.  November 18
th, 1971 was the first official birthday 
celebration of Sultan Qaboos and became known as ‘National Day’ (Queen Elizabeth II’s 
birthday also formally moved from April 21
st to June in the UK to accommodate the 
possibility of better weather). It was marked by a formal tea party in the gardens of his 
residence for senior Omani dignitaries and military personnel, the diplomatic corps, foreign 
professionals, advisors and consultants as well as senior palace staff. 
  For most Omanis, however, the tea party was of little significance.  Relatively few 
were invited in any one year.  For the masses – even from the remote interior - it was the 
ceremonial military parades held in newly constructed stadiums, the precision military drill 
teams, and the show of fighting strength of the new military units (Air Force, Army and Navy) 
under the command of Sultan Qaboos which mattered. These spectacles and the invitations to 
attend them were eagerly anticipated each year. In the first decade of his reign the public 
responded to these events with fascination and astonishment. But by the early 1980s Omani 
nationals began to expect greater showmanship and extravagance particularly at the National 
Days marking five year intervals. The celebrations for the 5
th, 10
th, 15th, were each outdone 
by the next with the apex being reached at the 20
th year celebrations in 1990 marked by a 
spectacular laser light show over the town of Muscat.  The fact that the 25
th anniversary 
celebrations in 1995 did not surpass those of the 20
th was widely remarked upon with 
disappointment by many
37.  
   Interwoven in the fabric of these newly created National Day celebrations was the 
incorporation and ‘modernization’ of the traditional camel races of the interior of the country. 





They had long been popular as a local and seasonal tribal activity.  However, with the 
introduction of vehicles and the increasing obsolescence of camels as beasts of burden
38, 
camels came to be seen as imbued with cultural symbolism of revival based on the 
racetrack
39. Regional races were held to determine which camels should be brought to the 
capital area to compete in the annual races sponsored by the Sultan. For the first 15 years of 
Sultan Qaboos’ reign these races were held on a simple open gravel plain near Seeb Palace. In 
1991 this track was converted into a formal race course especially designed to hold cam
within its boundary. The camel race had become part of the established tradition of markin
Omani unity and nationhood.  Its formal audience was the dignitaries and guests of the 
marking each annual National Day.  But it was the months-long build-up of qualifying 
regional trails to the National Day event which both united and captured the attention of the 
camel- owning population of the country - mainly the nomadic and recently settled pastoral 
communities of Oman. 
 
Creating Military Pageantry, Emblems, Decorations and Medals   
 
 Gradually over this first decade of Sultan Qaboos’ reign, an elaborate structure of ceremonial 
units emerged. In 1970, the Dhofar Force, a private army acting as personal bodyguards to the 
Sultan in Dhofar, was incorporated into The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). Shortly thereafter 
the Royal Guard Regiment
40 was formed, taking on protection as well as ceremonial duties 
covering investitures and state dinners, as well as guards of honour for visiting dignitaries
41 
both in the north and the south of the country and abroad on his travels.  This necessitated the 
creation of all the trappings which underpinned such ceremonial occasions: royal bands, 
mounted bands, the designing of uniforms, regimental colours, badges, emblems, flags and 
medals. By 1975 with the assistance of a succession of British advisors, regimental colours, 
facings of uniforms, berets and other requirements of ceremony had been determined.  In rapid 
succession, the Royal Guard Regiment formed the Royal Band South and the Royal Band 
North and later the Royal Mounted Band.  In 1978, a full mounted band performed on a 
National Day event
42.   
   Along with the creation of special military units with ceremonial functions came the 
requirement to create a national emblem which set Sultan Qaboos’ reign apart and gave it 
distinctiveness from previous Al Said rulers. The Al Said dynasty’s emblem, later called the 
National Emblem or Royal Arms of Oman is a device consisting of crossed Omani swords 
with a superimposed dagger (khanjar), a local Arab curved dagger which is worn on a waist 
belt and placed centrally in front of the body
43. This National Emblem formed the cap badge 
of the entire Sultan’s Armed Forces until 1977 when different unit and services badges were 
introduced, designed, or at the very least, approved, by the Sultan himself
44. These Royal 
Arms or National Emblems continued to feature in all Armed Forces cap badges and were 
used in many other badges.  The National Emblem of crossed khanjars was later surmounted 
by a crown and used for directly ‘royal’ entities, such as on the cap or rank badges of all the 
Sultan’s uniformed forces including the Royal Guard of Oman, Royal Yacht Squadron, Royal 
Army of Oman, Royal Air Force of Oman, Royal Navy of Oman, the Sultan’s Special Forces, 
Royal Oman Police and the Royal Flight.  This National Emblem and the various service cap 
badges and medals were familiar to most Omanis, including those in the interior of the 
country, from where serving soldiers and policemen were often recruited. 
  The evolution of medals in Oman mirrored the diversification in the Armed Forces. 
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The first medals in Oman emerged as a result of the Jebel Akhdar campaign in 1958/59. It was 
a Campaign Medal and was directly modelled on the British style of campaign medals
45. In 
1960 a Gallantry Medal was inaugurated and in 1965 a General Service Medal was instituted. 
But it was not until after the accession of Sultan Qaboos that this tradition of creating 
ceremonial awards was given real expression. Immediately after coming to power, Sultan 
Qaboos commissioned the Accession Medal and Order of Oman. This was followed by the 
Order of Renaissance
46 or Unity Medal, the Endurance Medal commemorating the end of the 
Dhofar War as well as a series of Anniversary and National Day medals to commemorate the 
1980 anniversary of the Sultan’s accession on 23
rd July 1970 and later the National Days of 
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005.  In 1976 an overall ‘order of wear’ was agreed by the 
Sultan encompassing the Orders and Medals to the Armed Forces. This was a simple list 
spanning five different categories. The more recent order of precedence (1995) produced by 
the Palace Office encompasses 26 different categories
47. 
   As the offices of government became established and the National Day celebrations 
came to be expected and regarded as ‘traditional’,  Sultan Qaboos searched for a more 
ceremonial and monarchic emblem to symbolically draw the Al-Said dynasty closer to with 
the elements of the modern state of Oman.   In 1977 Sultan Qaboos requested from John 
Kendall of Charles Kendall and Partners, some drawing or sketches for a royal or sultanic 
crown from which he might select a standard pattern for all future requirements
48. John 
Kendall commissioned J.R. Gaunt and Sons in Birmingham to carry out this request and in 
August of 1977 two sketches by one of the company’s commercial illustrators, a Ms. Garner, 
were sent to Muscat for Sultan Qaboos to review
49. These sketches were based on the St. 
Edward’s Crown. The Sultan selected one which was then integrated into the emblems and 
decorations of all his uniformed units, armed forces, and special service units.  This newly 
adopted crown symbolizing the power of the national sovereign enveloped and surrounded the 
earlier imagery of the young ruling monarch  
 
(insert figures A and B here.  Caption:  stylized rendition of the Sultanic crown). 
 
     
Meeting and Uniting the Omani People  
 
For Sultan Qaboos, the north of the country was new territory and its people were unfamiliar 
to him.   From the earliest days of his rule, he made regular efforts to meet with people in 
Muscat and elsewhere.  It was not unusual to find him inspecting, without warning, a ministry 
office building early in the day to see which employees were on time and busy, reprimanding 
those caught doing nothing or reading the newspapers.  He also took to viewing new 
development projects at night when no one was around
50.  In these early years, Sultan Qaboos 
frequently made short trips into the interior of the country to visit schools, government offices 
and to meet with the people.  In 1977 he made his first full crossing of the country from 
Salalah to Muscat on a tour of several weeks accompanied by units of the Royal Guard and 
the Royal Flight. He camped out in the desert and had set up at each campsite an elaborate 
circular tent for receiving foreign and national guests, as well as local petitioners. At first, 
these annual trips had an open and spontaneous quality to them.  Omanis from all walks of life 
could approach these campsites and request an audience with the Sultan. Unlike the rulers of 
the other Gulf States, Sultan Qaboos did not have a tradition of a weekly majlis (an open 
forum) where men came forward with their requests, complaints and petitions. These convoys 
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through the country became instruments for keeping in touch with local people and for 
measuring the public mood and sentiment.  Tribal leaders and commoners, old and young, 
could and did approach the Sultan on these occasions to air their grievances, present requests, 
or give their felicitations.  
  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these annual trips, sometimes as long as 4 or 6 weeks 
duration, became important rituals marking the transformation of the young monarch into the 
mature sovereign of the state
51. Although the actual camp residence of the Sultan on these 
tours was kept simple, the accompanying security and service provisions gradually became 
more elaborate. When the camps were some distance from the Capital, visiting dignitaries 
were transported to the Sultan’s camp by helicopters of the Royal Flight. The Sultan used to 
take as many ministers with him as possible.  Others ministers were summoned to these Royal 
camps by the Sultan after hearing local complaints or in order to put them into the line of fire 
when   a particular disgruntlement was highlighted.  Nearly each of these annual convoys 
would camp for a week or more on the edge of the rose-coloured sand dunes of the Empty 
Quarter in the Haylet il-Harashif of the Jiddat il-Harasiis. This remote campsite 500 
kilometres from Muscat and Salalah put the Sultan in the middle of tribal homelands and gave 
these communities special access to the Sultan’s court. Instead of an annual trip to Salalah by 
the tribal leaders to receive gifts for their allegiance, the tribes were ‘hosting’ the Sultan. 
Ironically, unlike the tribally-based Gulf States, where the royal courts had become urban-
based and fixed, the Royal Court of the Sultan was developing a mobile dimension.  Here, 
under the reign of Qaboos, the leader of the nation came to the tribal interior and camped in 
their midst, demonstrating his accessibility while cementing their sense of loyalty and 
nurturing their allegiance.  
  For the Harasiis tribe and other marginal and remote communities in the interior these 
annual tours and week-long national day celebrations established and consolidated the sense 
of obligation and the duties of the tribal community to the sovereign. Their emerging sense of 
‘Omaniness’ was built upon, and enhanced by, these invented and ceremonial acts which took 
on the appearance of long-held traditions. By the mid-1980s and onwards, Harasiis speech 
was peppered by references to the Sultan and the debt owed to him by the people of Oman - 
including the tribes of the interior. All discussion of programmes, services and anticipated 
development was prefaced with the expression ‘thanks to His Majesty the Sultan’.  And 
although an element of this speech was due to the formality of the language, the sentiment, in 
large measure, was sincere.  The “Why does the Sultan want to do this” of a decade earlier, 
was now replaced by the acceptance and recognition of their place in the order of things in 
Oman.  These communities knew they had access to their Sultan. He regularly visited and 
camped out among them.  Their interests were addressed on these occasions and many 
problems actually solved.  This contact between the subject and ruler, coupled with the 
elaboration and invention of ceremonies and rituals of monarchy that had developed over the 
previous two decades contributed significantly to the consolidation of the perception of the 
Sultan, by the various tribal peoples in the interior of the country, as ruler of Muscat and 
Oman, the sovereign of a state which encompassed Dhofar as well as the north of the country.    
  Only in the last decade has tradition and ceremonial started to become overgrown, 
intricate and incapable of flexibility.  The renaissance has moved into a baroque stage which 
by its formality and tortured protocol is gradually cutting people off from real access to the 
ruler and placing him on a pinnacle of power and authority. From an assured recognition of 
the whereabouts of  the Sultan between two palaces in the north and the south of the country 
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or else on  convoy to meet the people, has developed a complex pattern of movement between 
numerous palaces and frequent road convoys and ‘desert encampments’. In recent years the 
Sultan has taken to moving on convoy and camping in the interior of the country for at least 
four months of the year, the rest of the time is spent in one of his near dozen or more 
residences spread out around the country
52.  Even his palace compound in Muscat – once a 
discrete part of a traditional Muslim town - has sprawled over the entire town obliterating  
much of the old city including the traditional suq (market) and many of the former homes of  
British political advisers, the British and American Embassies, as well as homes once 
belonging to his uncles, nieces and nephews. This baroque growth, the creation of vast open 
spaces for royal displays, national day events and armed forces ceremonial activities (parades, 
tattoos, and celebrations with fireworks exploding from ramparts) has transformed a place 
once of much charm into a set location for the execution of the Sultan’s newly created royal 
traditions. These public spaces, then, have become fields of performance, appearances, images 
and displays reproducing the power relations and authority of the Sultan
53. 
  The association of ceremonial with actual authority and power is becoming less 
certain, and the cult of the person of the Sultan is increasingly supporting the further 
elaboration of rituals. The ‘Meet the People’ convoys now number more than 500 vehicles and 
when camped resemble massive caravan parks.  More significantly, it is no longer possible for 
the local Omani to gain access to the Sultan directly. The once privileged tribesmen of the 
interior desert are also unable now to directly access the Sultan. They, like all others, must 
make a written request of the wali or local governor. If it is approved, the petitioner is then 
permitted entry to a ‘large majlis tent’ where a Ministry of Interior representative holds 
audience.  
  The ideal of accessibility by a ruling monarch who moves around the country to meet 
his people has been undermined by the sheer numbers of people who now follow the convoys 
in an effort to reach out to the Sultan.  Today, the police barricades are too deep, and the 
number desiring a hearing too great to be accommodated. The eagerly anticipated annual 
convoy of the early decades for meeting the people of Oman and supported by near-
continuous live media coverage, has now become a set of carefully planned and 
choreographed road trips with hundreds of vehicles. Contemporary media coverage makes 
much use of archival footage of earlier trips.  
  Ever more frequently now, the Sultan sends out his ministers to hear his people’s 
grievances and to take up the topics the community wishes to discuss. More often than not, 
these grievances are filtered and little of the substance of these urgent matters or complaints 
reach the Sultan’s ears. Protocol and ritual elaborated and choreographed for one end, the 
socialization or inculcation of a value system and perceptions revolving around the notion of a 
single and coherent state or Sultanate of Oman seem to have become means unto themselves – 
the maintenance and continuity of the offices of the Royal Court.  As Geertz has suggested 
before, such ceremonials and spectacles are not merely representations of state power, but 
become instances of that power
54.    
  As the new traditions and ceremonials elaborated around the rule of Sultan Qaboos 
take on more formality and are increasingly rigidly interpreted by the supporting bureaucracy 
of the Royal Court, the very measures set up to unite the population and give legitimacy to a 
young ‘untested’ monarch are beginning to alienate and drive away the least-connected and 
marginal elements of the population
55.    The same Harasiis people who so enthusiastically 
welcomed the Sultan as their ruler in the 1980s and 1990s and adopted clear expressions and 
behaviours of national identity are now being driven away by both the barriers to access as 
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well as the decreasing cultural resonance of the more recent ceremonials and displays 
surrounding the Omani Royal Court.  The seeming disappearance of the Sultan behind police 
barricades and the mile-long convoys coupled with the fanciful architecture, the elaborate 
flyovers, landscaping and other trappings related to the modern Omani state has meant that for 
some, especially  the marginal tribal nationals discussed earlier, the patriarchal father figure 
has become too remote and culturally distant
56.   
  Among the Harasiis tribe this has meant that other traditions, more in keeping with 
their own customs, are resurfacing and gaining prominence.  The demand for respect for their 
mobility, regard for their land use and water rights, and equality of status among men are 
being expressed outright.  This has driven some families to move their primary households 
cross the Omani border into the United Arab Emirates (UAE) - often leaving satellite camps 
of herds of camels and goats behind in the care of hired Baluchi and Indian imported herders.  
There, the UAE rulers have built several new  ‘towns’ to house these and other nomadic 
tribesmen emigrating from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other points north.  Housed in free, well-
planned and widely spaced low-lying bungalows which suit their lifestyles, these mobile 
pastoral peoples receive subsidies for their livestock; and their access to local health and 
education services is not marked by discriminatory or patronizing practices. One recent 
Harasiis arrival told me, “Here no one treats you like dirt.  You are respected and your 
requests for assistance are not regarded as begging. But still the Jiddat is better, because 
without all our people together, our children will soon lose their Harsuusi language”
57.  Where 
once these Harasiis families did not know why the Sultan of Oman would want to immunize 
their children, they are now acutely aware that they have been prevented from approaching 
him with petitions or grievances. It is as though the Sultan - in the distances which have been 
created by the elaboration of rituals - can now longer be their tribal paterfamilias.  These 
observations derive, not from ignorance of their surroundings as may have been the case in the 
recent past, but rather from sophisticated observation of contemporary conditions
58.  Their 






Traditions and ceremonies have always been invented, elaborated and refined to meet the 
needs of those in power or to support perceptions of social cohesion, group membership as 
well as to legitimize particular relations of authority.  The invented ceremonies and traditions 
of the British monarchy are particularly exemplary of this process in their growing splendour, 
popularity and public appeal. Although originally elaborated to mark the power of the 
sovereign particularly in its development and display in Victorian India, these ceremonials 
eventually took on a life of their own. The awarding of medals and ceremonials, the creation 
of grand traditions and other ritualistic aggrandizements came to be possible only because of 
growing royal weakness.  In Great Britain, it can be argued that enhanced ceremonials were 
made possible as the power of the monarchy was exchanged for the popularity of the reigning 
sovereign. The less power retained in the hands of the monarch, the more the rituals and 
ceremonials around the royal household took on a life of their own defining and unifying a 
perception of national identity.  So too in Oman, the traditions multiplying and growing  
becoming more elaborate and fanciful year after year incorporating celebratory military 
parades, decorations and tattoos, national orchestral pieces, camel races, and laser light shows. 
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The Sultan remains the national figure of unity, elaborated out of the wealth of invented 
ceremonials and created traditions. The cult of personality around the person of the Sultan 
remains a popular one but the supporting rituals are ossifying and losing the element of 
purpose in underpinning a sense of social cohesion and unity in Oman.  As the Sultan has 
consolidated his hold on Oman, the ceremonials and rituals which he created have lost the 
sense of being accompaniments of his power.  Instead, the Sultan is becoming distant and 
inviolate; the over-elaborated trappings of power no longer serve to unite, but now instead set 
him apart and isolate him from his people. The increasing remoteness of the Sultan and his 
apparent ‘disappearance’ behind the walls of his many palaces is a reminder, a throwback to 
the days of his father’s reign.  For many Omanis this is an awkward link with the past.  But for 
the increasingly marginalized nomads, this loss of contact is acutely felt. A few have voted 
with their feet and moved out of his orbit of influence.   For all the new ceremonies and 
traditions, military pomp and ingenious media presentation of the Sultan’s meetings with his 
people, the general withdrawal of the person of the Sultan from the public is generally 
recognized and regretted.  Perhaps still holding some remnant attitude of gratitude for the 
rapid social and economic improvements in their lives, most – but not all -  the people of 
Oman  recognize their ‘Omaniness’ and  passively accept the barriers to contact which these 
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to office. 
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the Sharqiyya, Buraymi, as well as the Musandam which he reached by Royal Yacht. 
 
52  Sultan Qaboos generally spends one month each year on convoy and interior encampment 
during the Muslim Eid il-Fitr holiday and a second month during the Eid al-Adha holiday 
marking the end of the Pilgrimage to Mecca.  Then another two months are spent moving 
between the north and south of the country each year.    
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(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 33-52. 
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55   Nearly forty years after the introduction of mass education, 80% of Oman’s population  
currently has basic literacy skills; the young generation has near-universal literacy  and is able 
to communicate in ‘modern standard’ Arabic. One outcome of this laudable development 
achievement is that state sanctioned and directed discussion [generally on sectarian issues and 
politics] is now frequently subverted by the use of text, mobile phones and internet 
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58   During my interviews with these tribal families living in the United Arab Emirates in 
February 2006, I was constantly interrupted by individual Harasiis and asked to comment on 
the scandal surrounding the Danish cartoons of Mohammed which had just broken in the 
international press a few days earlier. 
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